Abstract:
… shall not disclose the information … unless the agency believes, on reasonable grounds,-… (e) that non compliance is necessary-(i) to avoid prejudice to the maintenance of the law by any public sector agency, including … the prevention, detection [and] investigation … of offences.
The purpose of the form's use is that the information should be disclosed because the police need it to investigate an offense.
Had the police, faced with the agencies' reticence, chosen to obtain production orders, they would have had to show, pursuant to the Search and Surveillance Act 2012 ("the SSA") that they had: Privacy Act 1993, s 6, cl 11(e)(i). 14 "Enforcement officer" is defined in the Search and Surveillance Act 2012, s 3(1).
15
See "Agency" and "Personal Information" as defined in the Privacy Act 1993, s 2(1).
Part II analyses the New Zealand courts' approaches to WRCIs. There is more than 20 years of New Zealand jurisprudence which holds, first, that police receipt of information is lawful if agencies release it pursuant to IPP11(e)(i); and secondly, that complainants cannot use the tort of breach of confidence to prevent third parties from disclosing their iniquitous behaviour to the police.
Following an examination of the approach to unreasonable search and seizure espoused in Hamed v R and by Canadian and United States jurisprudence, Part III argues that the approach established in Part II is inconsistent with the privacy interests which underlie s 21.
Unreasonableness
The second question under a s 21 analysis relies on a fact-specific policy analysis as to whether the complainant's reasonable expectations must 16 See Hamed, above n 12, at [161] , citing R v Jefferies [1994] The subject's consent is required if the release would breach a duty of confidence between the subject and the agency or would infringe upon the subjects property rights or personal dignity. 25 If none of these are implicated, the agency may validly consent to the information's release.
26
As the following analysis shows, later courts have used Fisher J's exception as the basis for holding that WRCIs are lawful because they infringe no property or confidentiality interests. (1) concerning confidential (not publically known) information;
A Principle 11 of the Privacy Act
(2) arising when that information is imparted to another under circumstances implying that the recipient will not disclose the information;
(3) being breached by the recipient if they make unauthorised disclosure or use of the information; and (4) being qualified a legitimate public concern or other just cause for disclosure.
Where such a duty attaches to the information disclosed, release thereof infringes upon a subscriber's interests.
31
In R v H, the defendant (H) sought to exclude documents, provided to police by H's accountant (D), which showed that H had circumvented fishing quota reporting requirements by bribing a fisheries officer. Zealand courts to protect privacy interests from state intrusion. Given that information held by agencies can be lawfully released on request, the latter's approach seriously limits the scope of privacy in an age where more and more personal information is held by third parties.
A The Approach Taken to Search and Seizure in Hamed
Hamed represents the current New Zealand approach to s 21. 48 The case concerned the admissibility of covert video surveillance obtained pursuant to warrants incapable of authorising such surveillance. 49 The majority held that the police surveillance which took place on private land constituted an unreasonable search under s 21 because, absent valid warrants, the police actions amounted to a trespass, rendering their activities unlawful. will not disclose their information, the courts will not hold this expectation to be reasonable. The rest of this Part argues that the courts are not correct to hold that such expectations are unreasonable in respect of WRCIs.
B Conceptualising the Issues of Applying Hamed to WRCIs
Any analysis of an expectation's reasonableness must not conflate the two issues which WRCIs raise. The first is whether people lose a reasonable expectation of privacy because they communicate information to a third party.
This question is important because there can be no blanket rule that all third parties owe a person privacy or confidence in information communicated to, or received by them. This would run contrary to well-established law that the public nature of an observed action diminishes or destroys the subject's reasonable expectations of privacy therein.
63
Regarding breaches of confidence, courts have held that a third party who views an occurrence in public is under no duty of confidence to the subject.
64
If the first issue is answered in the negative, the second issue is whether that answer would be different if the information concerned the subject's wrongdoing. This second point is important because, in many cases, the police approach agencies before they have concrete evidence to suspect the subject of wrongdoing or where there is no allegation of wrongdoing.
65
If the information's disclosure of wrongdoing has no impact on the first issue, then it ought to follow that the answer to the second issue would not be different if the information did not concern the subject's wrongdoing. (1) the nature of the information; and (2) any liability on the part of the "acquirer and discloser" for any breach of confidence.
Moreover, if the acquirer had actual knowledge that a duty of confidence existed, they would be presumed to have acted unconscionably and face "almost insuperable difficulties" in displacing that presumption.
113
Application of Hunt to WRCIs is factually difficult. It is hard to ascertain whether police are aware that agencies hold information subject to duties of confidence (if the agency in fact does). Certainly, in relying on IPP11(e)(i), officers must be aware that agencies have a duty not to release information unless the exception applies; but this is not equivalent actual knowledge of a duty of confidence. It is thus hard to conclude in the abstract whether or not a duty of confidence between a subject and an agency will bind the police. This Part argues that WRCIs are not authorised by law and are thus prima facie unreasonable. In particular, this Part argues that the production order regime has excluded any common law right that the police might have to conduct WRCIs. Moreover, it is arguable that the policy issues surrounding
WRCIs mean that courts should hold them to amount to an unreasonable search or seizure per s 21.
Since this paper argues that WRCIs are unlawful per se, it is unnecessary (and impossible in the abstract) to examine whether they might become unreasonable because of the manner in which they are carried out.
A Are WRCIs lawful?
Lawfulness is a question of whether the search or seizure should have "occurred at all". 118 We are concerned with the request, rather than the receipt. nonetheless be authorised by a "third source of power", which allows police to conduct WRCIs in the absence of any law expressly prohibiting them.
119
It must be noted that this Part deals with police requests under ordinary circumstances, ignoring requests made in exigent circumstances -such as missing persons, abductions or other life-threatening cases, in which time is of the essence. In such cases, the time required to obtain a production order (which this paper argues should be the legal requirement for police requests)
would likely have an intolerable impact on the outcome. 120 Indeed, there is ample authority that the code created by the SSA does not cover exigent circumstances.
121
Similarly, where a warrant could have been sought, a warrantless search will be unreasonable absent necessity.
122

The Privacy Act 1993
One could argue that principle 2 authorises police requests. It requires that agencies "shall collect … information directly from the individual concerned" unless doing so would cause "prejudice to the maintenance of the law". Per that argument, police may obtain information from agencies if collecting it from the subject would prejudice the maintenance of the law.
However, principle 2 is one of the "Information Privacy Principles" 123 -a principle does not amount to an authorisation and nothing therein confers a power to collect information. In essence, principle 2 states that if a power to collect information is exercised, it must be exercised in accordance with principle 2. Principle 11, upon which the police most explicitly rely when making WRCIs, 124 is couched in similar terms: agencies must not disclose information unless they believe on reasonable grounds that non-compliance is necessary to avoid prejudice to the maintenance of the law. This exception immunises agencies which disclose personal information, protecting them from liability under the Privacy Act if the Privacy Commissioner determines that the release was warranted by IPP11(e)(i) -it is a shield for agencies.
Privacy Act relationships are between subjects and agencies; nothing implicates the police or implies that principle 11 is a sword for police. An agency's power to disclose does not correlate with a police right to seek that information; nor does the Privacy Act confer a right upon the latter to seek disclosure, which would place any duty upon the agency to accede to WRCIs. 125 Additionally, the police practice of seeking a warrant in the event of refusal militates against a conclusion that police have a power which disables an agency from resisting disclosure -if the police had the power to compel disclosure, a warrant would be unnecessary.
126
The Law Commission has attempted to clarify the position regarding principle 11. In their review of the Privacy Act, the Commission stopped short of recommending that the principle be interpreted or amended to authorise WRCIs, recommending instead that the principle be redrafted to specifically cover agencies' ability to disclose information about offending. police exercise of power such that it is unlawful for police, absent exigent circumstances, to make WRCIs. Under s 72 of the SSA production orders can be issued only if the applicant has reasonable grounds to:
(1) "suspect that an offence has been committed"; and (2) "believe that the documents sought … constitute [relevant] evidential material" and are in the possession of the person to whom the order is directed. This is nearly identical to the requirement under IPP11(e)(i) that agencies must not release personal information unless they have reasonable grounds to believe that withholding the information would cause "prejudice to the maintenance of the law". Implicit in IPP11(e)(i) is that the agency must satisfy itself that an offence has actually been committed. Though "prejudice to the maintenance of the law" is left undefined, it is arguable that the police's inability to advance a criminal investigation would fall within this definition.
If police must demonstrate the same factors to obtain production orders as agencies must have to release information, production orders would clearly demonstrate to agencies that IPP(11)(e)(i)'s requirements were satisfied.
Given, therefore, that the two regimes cover the same situations in the same (or nearly the same) manner, it is arguable that the SSA covers the field and excludes the jurisprudence on WRCIs. Encouraging agencies to report suspected crimes is in the public interest and to prohibit this would impede the police's ability to investigate crime. But a distinction must be drawn between this (along with witness disclosures to police) and WRCIs. To obtain disclosure, the former relies on the discloser's initiative whilst the latter relies on a request carrying the weight of police necessity which risks engendering a sense of apparent compulsion in recipients.
Our courts' lack of distinction ignores the practical realities of our modern information society, diminishing the scope of protection for personal 
V Conclusion
The New Zealand courts' approach to WRCIs does not reflect the first principles approach to s 21 espoused by the Canadian cases or by Hamed.
Importantly, the approach is also no longer suited to the digital age. This paper has argued that our courts must reformulate their approach to better reflect these fundamental principles. Particularly, it should not be permissible for This paper has also argued that, notwithstanding the likely inconvenience to police, WRCIs are neither lawful nor reasonable. In any case, following the enactment of the SSA, the police have ample tools to compel agencies to disclose information. It follows that, except in urgent cases, agencies should not disclose information to police except upon receipt of a production order. To do otherwise would make banks, power companies and the like complicit in the erosion of reasonable expectations of privacy and would fly in the face of agencies' obligations of confidence.
If this means that the police must let (suspected) cannabis cultivators or methamphetamine dealers go free for want of evidence, so be it; it is worth it to preserve the freedom of citizens (including journalists, activists and the like) to be free from having their "secret affairs" intruded upon, "read over"
and "pried into". To use the words of the plaintiff's plea in Entick, above n 106, at 1029. 
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